The document's eight pages, which include embarrassing instructions on how to differentiate between different yet related terms ("it is possible," "it may be so," "one must not remove from the equation," and "it's reasonable to assume"), enable the Ayatollas' nuclear and operations officials and the heads of the Revolutionary Guards to reach this soothing conclusion - from their point of view: The Americans have no understanding of what is really happening in Iran's nuclear program. They have no solid information, they have no high-level agents and they have nothing more than a mix of guesswork and chatter. The dissemblance and concealment have succeeded, and the real dispute is not between Washington and Tehran, but within the U.S. administration itself. [Haaretz]
Mr. Hadley said the drastic reversal in the intelligence agencies' knowledge about Iran's weapons programs was based "on new intelligence, some of which has been received in the last few months." [...]
With some of the administration's most prominent hawks having departed and not taking part in the review of findings like these, it is possible that the zeal for another military conflict has diminished. After all, the first two wars on Mr. Bush's watch remain unresolved at best. [Der Spiegel]
THE latest US National Intelligence Estimate on
The less charitable interpretation is that the release of the NIE's key findings reflects the muddled workings of an increasingly byzantine administration at war with its own military and intelligence communities. [The Australian]
Iran has welcomed the new NIE, repeating claims that its nuclear programme is not intended for weapons use. Israel, Britain and France have all called for continued pressure to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb. The NIE strongly suggests that there may be a political way out of confrontation with Iran, saying that the country's nuclear programme is guided by “a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic and military costs.” Thus it may be amenable to a combination of threats, diplomatic pressure and “opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige and goals for regional influence...” The NIE admits that it is difficult to know what sort of grand bargain might work, but that is a matter for diplomats not intelligence agents to ponder. [The Economist]
In the contest for influence between U.S.-backed liberal democracy and champion of radical Islamism Iran, guess who just emerged as the strong horse and who the weak horse? The Saudis seem to have it pretty well figured out. Doubtless the Israelis have, too. After their lightning raid on Syria's North Korean-built nuclear facility in September no one can doubt the Israelis' determination or capability to defend its right to exist. In light of its own failure of will to do the same, perhaps that's what the U.S. is counting on.
Punt to Israel. [Middle East Times]
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